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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a premises liability action based on claims of negligent failure to warn of recurring 
and continuous dangerous conditions on the premises and failure to exercise ordinary care to 
maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On August 1, 2016, Appellant, Michael Johnson, filed his complaint in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Ada County, Idaho, seeking recovery for injuries to his right knee as a result of 
slipping on a spill at Wal-Mart Store 2508 located at 8300 West Overland Road, Boise, Idaho. In his 
complaint, Appellant brought claims for negligence and premises liability. 1 On August 23, 2016, 
Respondents filed their answer.2 
On May 10, 2017, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment. 3 Respondents argued, 
inter alia, that Appellant could not prove premises liability on the theory of method of business or 
recurring or continuous hazard, and that Respondents were not negligent for failing to warn of, or 
remedy, the isolated incident at the particular location and on the particular day that Appellant 
slipped and fell because there were no prior incidents at that exact location and because there is no 
evidence of how long the spill was present before Appellant encountered it.4 
On May 25, 2017, Appellant filed an opposition to Respondents' motion for summary 
I R. 000006-10. 
2 R. 000011-18. 
3 R. 000019-35. 
4 R. 000019-35. 
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judgment. 5 Appellant presented evidence that, inter alia, Respondents were engaged in a method of 
business that they knew created a recurring or continuous spill and slip hazard; that they knew such 
method of business created a foreseeable risk of harm; and that they failed to warn customers, like 
Appellant, about such risk. 6 
On May 31, 2017, Respondents filed its reply brief. 7 Respondents argued, inter alia, that a 
dangerous business practice was not established merely because customers can carry liquids around 
the store. 8 Respondents also argued that a mere possibility of a spill is not sufficient for liability -
but that it must be shown that Respondents knew of a greater than usual likelihood of a spill in a 
particular area. 9 
On June 7, 2017, a hearing was held on the Respondents' motion. 10 By order dated June 22, 
2017, the Trial Court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment. 11 The Trial Court issued 
a judgment on July 3, 2017, dismissing all of Appellant's claims with prejudice. 12 Mr. Johnson filed 
his Notice of Appeal on August 2, 2017. 13 
C. Statement of Facts 
a. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ("Wal-Mart Corporate") owns and operates Respondent Wal-
Mart Store 2508, in Boise, Idaho. 14 
5 R. 000084-99. 
6 R. 000084-99. 
7 R. 000175-186. 
8 R. 000180-182. 
9 R. 000180-182. 
10 Tr. (6/7/2017), 4-27. 
II R. 000187-193. 
12 R. 000194-195. 
13 R. 000196-199. 
14 R. 000113 (Wal-Mart Rule 30(b)(6), pp. 16:18 - 17:15). 
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b. For about four years leading upto June, 2015, and the day that Appellant slipped on a 
spill at Respondent's Wal-Mart Store 25 08, Respondent knew that spills were a big problem at Store 
2508. In June, 2011, Respondent issued an internal warning to alert its employees about the spill 
problem: 
• Spills are largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents in the 
store. Slip/trip/fall accidents are included in the Big 3 accident 
focus and require additional focus to reduce these accident 
claims. 
(R. 000166; see also, R.000115 (February 28, 2017, Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Wal-Mart 
Defendants ("Wal-Mart 30(b )( 6)"), p. 25 :9-11, designee testifying internal policy about spills being 
largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accident was to educate employee about the hazard: "Q. [The 
internal policy is to] [ e ]ducate] [employees] about the hazards of the spills on the premises? A. 
Yes."). 
c. By June, 2015, which is four years after the internal warning was first issued, spills 
remained a problem at Respondent's Store 2508: 
Q. So the second page in 114, the first bullet point there says 
spills are largely responsible for slip, trip and fall accidents in 
the store. Do you see that there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As of June of2015 was that statement true for Store 2508? 
A. Yes. 15 
d. Despite Respondent's knowledge of the spill hazard, and knowing it needed to warn 
its employees about it, Respondent is not aware of ever having warned customers about the hazard: 
15 R. 000127 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 75:10-17). 
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Q. Did Wal-Mart, in June of 2015, did Wal-Mart do anything to 
alert customers to that fact? 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q. Is there a sign that says warning, customers, spills are largely 
responsible for slip, trip, fall accidents in this store? 
A. I'm not sure. I don't -- I'm not sure. 
Q. If you don't know, is there anyone a[t] Store 2508, your store, 
who would know about such a warning being posted? 
A. Yeah, I haven't seen a warning posted. 16 
e. Knowing that spills were largely responsible for slip, trip, and fall accidents 
throughout the entire Store 2508, Respondent created employment positions whose sole job it was to 
walk the store's action alley: 
Q. Does Wal-Mart have a position where their sole job is to 
cruise the aisles all day looking for spills? 
A. We have a strategic team that works on the floors during the 
high traffic hours. 
Q. What are the high traffic hours? 
A. Eleven to eight. 
Q. Eleven a.m. to eight p.m.? 
A. Correct. 
Q. How many -- and their sole job is to cruise aisles and look for 
spills? 
A. They cruise -- they go around the racetrack or action alley. 17 
f. The action alley circles different sections of the store. Respondent's 30(b )(6) witness 
identified the action alley with yellow highlighting on the map of Store 2508: 
16 R. 000127-128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 75:18 - 76:5). 
17 R. 000117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 33:3-15). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4 
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(R. 000147 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), Ex. 2); R. 117-118 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 33:3 -37:10, designee 
identifying location of action alley throughout store 2508). 
f. Knowing that spills were largely responsible for slip, trip, and fall accidents at Store 
2508, and throughout the entire store, Respondent also requires its employee to be continuously 
looking out for spills in their areas when they are on the store floor: 
A. . .. while the associates are out on the floor doing whatever 
they're doing, they're supposed to be looking for, you know, 
things on the floor or spills while they are out there on the 
floor. It is not a by hour thing. It is while they are out there, 
they are supposed to be looking and making sure there is 
nothing on the floor or, you know, doesn't have to be on the 
floor. It could be, you know, something else that they find 
where they're going -- that they're making sure that -- trying to 
make sure that the area is safe for the customer. 
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Q. All the time? 
A. Yeah. I mean, it could be in the back room. Making sure it is 
safe in the back room. It could be on the floor. While they're 
in the building, they are supposed to be making sure their 
immediate area they are in is safe for the customer. 
Q. What does Wal-Mart do to make sure that every square inch 
of Store 2508 is getting an associate's eyes on it to make sure 
that it is safe? 
A. It's just -- it's part of the culture. I don't know how else to 
explain it. It is, you know, they're taught it. There is 
computer-based learning that that we go through that talks 
about it. There is policies that they can review or reviewed 
with them. And then there's just the layers of people in the 
building that help make sure it happens. 
Q. Is there a method or a policy or something that Wal-Mart has 
to make sure that every aisle is getting a safety sweep at least 
every certain number of minutes? 
A. No, it's -- no. 18 
g. On June 30, 2015, Appellant was a guest of Respondent's Store 2508. Appellant was 
looking for motorcycle tie-down straps, and was directed by a store employee to go down the 
housewares aisle in the direction of the aisle containing the straps. 19 As Appellant neared the end of 
the housewares aisle, he slipped in a liquid.20 
h. The end of the housewares aisle where Appellant encountered the spill was 
immediately adjacent to the action alley. Respondent's store manager and 30(b)(6) witness 
identified the action alley with yellow highlighting and the location of the spill encountered by 
Appellant with a red circle: 
18 R. 000116-117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 30:24 - 32:9). 
19 R. 000042-43; 47-48; and 52-54 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 95:16 -96:13 (describing 
incident); 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident); 112:15 - 114:23 (confirming June 30, 2015, incident 
statement and incident date). 
20 R. 000042-43; 47-48; and 52-54 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 95:16 - 96:13 (describing 
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u. 
R. 147 (Ex. 2 to 30(b)(6) R. 80 (Declaration of 
Depo); R. 117-118 (pp. Jason Walker, ,-i 12 and 
33:3 - 37:10, designee Ex. A thereto, showing 
identifying location of location of slip with red 
action alley immediately circle) 
adjacent to housewares 
alle with hi hli hter 
1. Another of Respondent's employees was immediately across from where Appellant 
encountered the spill.21 The employee was by the front cone of the bike rack immediately across the 
action alley that Appellant slipped into.22 
J. At no time during his visit to Respondent's Store 2508 was Appellant warned of the 
risks of spills on the premises.23 
k. At no time during Appellant's visit to Respondent's Store 2508 did Appellant see any 
incident); 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident); 112:15 - 114:23 (confirming June 30, 2015, incident 
statement and incident date)). 
21 R. 000047-48 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident and 
employee standing near spill). 
22 R. 000157 (Respondent employee incident statement); R. 000125 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 66:12-
67:22 (30(b )(6) witness identifying the employee witness standing by bike rack and bike rack being 
across from the housewares aisle). 
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signs warning of the risks of spills on the premises. 24 
1. Respondent's internal warning to employees that spills are throughout the store, and 
not just isolated to aisles where fluids are stored for sale, is reasonable, because liquids are permitted 
to come into and move around all over Respondent's store without any restriction: 
Q. At the time of Mr. Johnson's fall, did Wal-Mart prohibit 
customers from bringing liquids in to Store 2508? 
A. No. 
Q. So customers could bring in liquids of any type when they 
came in to shop? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there any restrictions on what the liquid was carried in? 
A. No. 
Q. Could it be a water bottle like you've got there with a little 
screw top on it, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It could be an open mug like your coffee mug there? 
A. Yes.25 
*** 
Q. Did the greeter check to make sure that customers bringing 
liquids in to the store were in containers that wouldn't spill? 
A. Not that I'm aware of.26 
*** 
Q. BY MR. SWARTZ: You could determine how and when 
beverages leave the restaurant portion of your store, right? 
23 R. 000100-101. 
24 R. 000100-101. 
25 R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21 :11 - 22:1). 
26 R. 000128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 79:5-8). 
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MS. MULLER: Referring to McDonalds? 
MR. SWARTZ: Yes. 
THE WITNESS: The space the McDonalds owns is leased to 
McDonald's. 
Q. BYMR. SWARTZ: Yes. 
A. So McDonalds is McDonalds. They are just leasing the space 
from our store. 
Q. Sure. And you can stand at the line between the leased space 
and your store and you could tell customers, I'm sorry, but you 
cannot bring your beverage in to my store without having a 
fixed lid on it, right? 
A. No, I mean I would have to get approval to do that through 
Wal-Mart Corporate home office. 
Q. Have you ever asked about trying to put some restrictions on 
beverages being carried around your store? 
A. I personally have not asked. 
Q. Have you ever asked about putting some restrictions on what 
customers can bring in to the store as far as liquids go? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Knowing that spills are largely responsible for slip, trip and 
fall accidents in Store 2508, would you agree with me that it 
would be a reasonable thing for you to do in restricting how 
customers can carry beverages around your store? 
MS. MULLER: Objection. Form. Go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: I have to adhere to the policies and procedures that 
are laid out by Wal-Mart Stores, Incorporated. 
Q. BY MR. SWARTZ: And they don't have a policy or 
procedure for assisting customers with making sure that 
they're carrying their liquids appropriately? 
A. Not to my knowledge.27 
27 R. 000129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 80:4 - 81:19). 
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*** 
Q. At the time of Mr. Johnson's fall at Store 2508, did Wal-Mart 
Store 2508 sell products that were liquid based? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did Wal-Mart, at the time of the fall, did Wal-Mart direct, 
prohibit, restrict in any way how a customer could move 
liquids within Store 2508? 
A. No.28 
II. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err by granting summary judgment to the Respondents? 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court Erred as Matter of Law by Granting Summary Judgment to the 
Respondents 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary judgment de novo, and it applies the 
same standards used by the trial court.29 A grant of summary judgment is warranted where it is 
shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw."30 
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or 
proof at trial, the genuine issue of material fact burden may be carried by establishing the absence of 
evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. 31 Such an 
28 R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10). 
29 Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,394,224 P.3rd, 458,461 (2008). 
30 I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
31 Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct. App. 2000). 
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absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's 
own evidence, or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such 
proof of an element is lacking. 32 Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden 
then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or 
affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure 
to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(f). 33 "The burden of proving the absence of an issue of material fact rests 
at all times upon the moving party."34 
A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the case may be different. 35 
"Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact. ... However, the non-moving 
party may not rest on a mere scintilla of evidence."36 If the evidence is conflicting on material 
issues, or if reasonable minds could reach different conclusions, summary judgment is not 
appropriate.37 The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party.38 All 
reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party.39 
B. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST ON RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS 
PRACTICES CREATING A RECURRING OR CONTINUOUS CONDITION THAT GIVES 
RISE TO A FORESEEABLE RISK OF HARM 
The Trial Court missed or ignored and/or failed to draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence showing Respondent's recurring or continuous spill problem that it failed to warn of, and 
failed to correct. Appellant's slip and fall on that particular day, particular spot, and particular way, 
32 Heath, 134 Idaho at 712, 8 P.3d at 1255. 
33 Heath, 134 Idaho at 712, 8 P.3d at 1255. 
34 Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439,444 (2004) (emphasis added). 
35 Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 849, 908 P.2d 143, 151 (1995). 
36 Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540,545,328 P.3d 520, 525 (2014). 
37 Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,436, 807P.2d 1272, 1274 (1991). 
38 Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't. of Agric., 149 Idaho 777,779,241 P.3d 950,952 (2010). 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF- 11 
may have been an isolated incident, but Respondent's continuous and recurring spill problem 
throughout the entire store is not isolated. Evidence shows that Respondent's business practices give 
rise to the foreseeable risk of a spill and resulting harm in all sections of its store. Even more 
significant is evidence that shows Respondent's business practices give rise to the foreseeable risk of 
a spill and resulting harm in the aisle immediately adjacent to the spill where Appellant slipped. 
The Trial Court missed or ignored this evidence and/or failed to draw reasonable inference in 
Appellant's favor, and, in so doing, erred in refusing to apply the recurring or continuous hazard 
theory in this case. The Trial Court held it "won't impute knowledge to Walmart simply because it 
lets customers carry beverages about the store. That is a commonplace business practice."40 The 
Trial Court also concluded that while spills "might be a fact of life, spills on the trash-can aisle 
... aren't, or at least hadn't been before Johnson's accident" and on that basis concluded that 
Appellant's slip and fall was an isolated incident.41 
In so doing, the Trial Court was hyper-focused on Respondent's testimony that it was 
unaware of a spill occurring in the houseware aisle before June 30, 2015, and the absence of any 
evidence of a liquid being stored in that aisle.42 That led the Trial Court to then conclude that 
evidence of Respondent allowing customers to carry beverages about the store was not enough to 
impute knowledge of the particular spill, at the particular spot, and at the particular time of 
Appellant's slip on the spill.43 
But, the Trial Court missed or ignored and/or failed to draw reasonable inferences from the 
39 Heath, 134 Idaho at 712, 8 P.3d at 1255. 
40 R. 000191. 
41 R. 000191. 
42 R. 000190-191. 
43 R. 000191. 
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evidence that for about four years before the spill encountered by Appellant, Respondent's store 
operations resulted in spills being largely responsible for slip, trip and fall accidents in the store. 
Respondent alerted its employees to this fact in June, 2011, as part ofits internal policies. The spills 
were a big enough problem that Respondent alerted the employees about the spills on the premises to 
educate the employees about the hazardous condition: 
• Spills are largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents in the 
store. Slip/trip/fall accidents are included in the Big 3 accident 
focus and require additional focus to reduce these accident 
claims. 
(R. 000166; see also R. 000115 (February 28, 2017, Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Wal-Mart 
Defendants ("Wal-Mart 30(b )( 6)"), p. 25 :9-11, designee testifying internal policy about spills being 
largely responsible for slip/trip/fall accidents was to educate employee about the hazard: "Q. [The 
internal policy is to] [ e ]ducate] [employees] about the hazards of the spills on the premises? A. 
Yes."). 
By June, 2015, Respondent was still warning its employees about spills largely being 
responsible for accidents in the store.44 Respondent admits that by June, 2015, about four years after 
issuing the internal warning, spills were still largely responsible for slips/trips/falls in Store 2508.45 
In light of the internal warning being issued and staying in effect for about four years, it is reasonable 
to infer that spills are not isolated incidents at Respondent's Store 2508. The Trial Court failed to 
draw this reasonable inference. 
44 R. 000127 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 75:10-17). 
45 R. 000127 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 75:10-17). 
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Also, Respondent's warning to its employees is not limited to a particular section of the store, 
such as the produce aisle, the beverage aisles, or other liquid products aisles. Respondent, instead, 
warns of spills "in the store" - as in the whole store.46 
Respondent's warning to its employees also does not identify a particular source of spills, 
such as leaking products. Respondent, instead, warns of "spills" - as in all types of spills. 47 
Respondent's store-wide warning to its employees makes sense. Respondent's operations 
create an environment where liquids in the store are not limited to a particular type, nor are they 
restricted to a particular section in the store. Liquids in the store may be for sale, or may be brought 
into the store by customers, or may be purchased in the store and consumed in the store by 
customers.48 Further, no liquid - whether for sale, or not - is restricted to a particular part of the 
store. There are no restrictions on how liquids may be carried or transported around the store.49 
Even if Respondent did not know that a spill of any type can end up in any part of its store, it 
certainly knew that there was a greater than usual likelihood of a spill occurring immediately 
adjacent to the spill that Appellant encountered. Respondent has employees whose sole job it is to 
look for spills in the action alley. 50 The spill that Appellant encountered is where the action alley and 
housewares alley meet. Respondent's store manager and 3 0(b )( 6) witness identified the action alley 
with yellow highlighting and the location of the spill encountered by Appellant with a red circle: 
46 R. 000166. 
47 R. 000166. 
48 R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21:11 - 22:1); R. 000128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 79:5-8); 
R. 000128-129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 78:15 - 81 :19); R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10). 
49 R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21 :11 - 22:1); R. 000128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 79:5-8); 
R. 000128-129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 78: 15 - 81 :19); R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10). 
50 R. 000117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 33:3-15). 
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u. 
(R. 147 (Ex. 2 to 30(b)(6) (R. 80 (Declaration of Jason 
Depo); R. 117-118 (pp. 33:3 Walker, ,12 and Ex. A 
-37:10, designee identifying thereto, showing location of 
location of action alley slip with red circle) 
immediately adjacent to 
housewares alley with 
highlighter); R. 147 (Ex. 2 to 
30 b 6 De osition 
If, as here, spills in the action alley were so foreseeable to Respondent that it created 
employment positions specifically to walk the action alley looking for spills, it is reasonable to infer 
that spills immediately adjacent to the action alley are also foreseeable. The Trial Court's conclusion 
that spills are only foreseeable in areas where liquids are being stored is inconsistent with 
Respondent's business practices - as evidenced by Respondent hiring employees whose sole job it is 
to walk the action alley that circles the entire store, is not exclusive to aisles with liquid products, 
and which runs immediately adjacent to the spill encountered by Appellant. Respondent obviously 
foresaw that spills can happen anywhere in its store. 
Respondent does not just expect spills where liquids are stored for sale or in the action alley, 
either. It has its employees looking for spills throughout the entire building- they are supposed to be 
looking for spills wherever they are: "While [ employees are] in the building, they are supposed to be 
making sure their immediate area they are in is safe for the customer.51 
51 R. 000116-117 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 31 :14-17). 
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Respondent's foresight about spills taking place anywhere in its store is reasonable in light of 
its business practices and its long history of recurring or continuous spill problem. Respondent 
allows customers to come into the store with beverages of their choice and in containers of their 
choice.52 Respondent has an in-store McDonald's restaurant, and allows McDonald's customers to 
leave the restaurant with drinks. 53 Respondent also sells a large number of liquids in its store. 54 
There are no restrictions on how liquids can move throughout the store. 55 This business practice is 
not isolated. It is recurring and continuous - so much so that Respondent continuously looks for 
spills throughout its whole store, including the location of the spill that Appellant encountered. 
The evidence demonstrates that Respondent knew, or, by exercise of reason should have 
known, that its operating methods created a "continuous or easily foreseeably" dangerous spill 
condition, and that is a sufficient basis for liability under Idaho law. See All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 
109 Idaho 479, 482, 708 P.2d 884, 887 (1985) (evidence of pot holes, in general, rather than a 
specific pot hole in a specific location, was sufficient evidence to justify submitting the case to a 
jury). See also, Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540, 549-51, 328 P.3d 520, 529-31 (2014) (liability 
may exist if the landowner or possessor has a habit of creating a foreseeably unsafe condition or 
allows an unsafe condition to develop or exist over a period of time.); Ball v. City ofBlaclfoot, 152 
Idaho 673, 677-78, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270-71 (2012) (liability through showing of premises 
maintenance habit); and Mann v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 95 Idaho 732,518 P.2d 1194 (1974) (liability 
where dangerous condition existed over a period of time). There are genuine issue of material fact 
52 R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 21:11 - 22:1). 
53 R. 000128-129 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 79:9 - 81:19). 
54 R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-5). 
55 R. 000114 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), p. 22:2-10). 
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about Respondent's spill-prone business operations that only a jury can answer. Summary judgment 
in Respondent's favor was granted in error. 
As the All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., case makes clear, evidence of generally recurring or 
continuously hazardous conditions is sufficient evidence to present to a jury. In All, the Plaintiff 
presented evidence of the general condition of a proprietor's parking lot forming pot holes over a 
period of time. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Plaintiffs evidence of the general condition 
was sufficient, and that the Plaintiff need not show evidence of the proprietor's knowledge of the 
specific pot hole in which Plaintiff fell: 
In the instant case, Mrs. All presented sufficient evidence to establish 
that the dangerous condition of the parking lot was a continuous and 
foreseeable consequence of Shelby's and Smith's operating methods. 
The formation of the specific hole into which Mrs. All fell was not an 
isolated incident. Therefore, it was unnecessary for Mrs. All to show 
that Shelby's and Smith's had actual or constructive knowledge of the 
specific pothole involved. It was enough to show that they were aware 
of the continuous formation of potholes in the parking lot through the 
winter and spring of 1982. 
All v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., l 09 Idaho 4 79, 482, 708 P .2d 884, 887 (1985). As with the pot holes in 
All, spills at Store 2508 are not isolated incidents. They were a big enough problem throughout the 
whole store that Respondent warned its own employees about spills for about four years before the 
spill encountered by Appellant. Spills in the action alley immediately next to where Appellant 
encountered the spill were a big enough problem that Respondent created positions whose sole job it 
was to look for spills there. And, the action alley and the location where Appellant encountered the 
spill are not separated by a bright line or barrier, but merge into one another. 
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Given the lack of separation between the action alley and the exit of the housewares aisle 
where Appellant encountered the spill, this case is also analogous to Shea v. Kevic Corporation, 156 
Idaho 540, 328 P .3d 520(2014). The Plaintiff in Shea presented evidence of a recurring dangerous 
condition of ice build-up, generally, at the exit of a car wash, but not at the specific location of her 
slip within the general exit area. The Idaho Supreme Court held such evidence was sufficient to 
create a genuine issue of material fact: 
Although Shea has not shown that Kevic had actual knowledge of the 
specific ice buildup in front of Shea's car, and that it had existed for a 
sufficient time to allow warning or correction, this Court concludes 
that Shea has offered more than a scintilla of evidence to prove that 
Kevic had actual or constructive notice of operating methods that 
could cause a dangerous condition of ice buildup when and where 
Shea fell. 
Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 540,550,328 P.3d 520, 530 (2014). 
The reasonable inference to be drawn in Appellant's favor here is that spills were, or should 
have been, reasonably foreseeable in the general area of the action alley just as much as they were in 
the action alley. This is particularly true where, as here, the spill at the housewares aisle exit merges 
into the action alley without any physical separation and are, effectively, one-in-the-same general 
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C. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS ON RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO 
KEEP THE PREMISES IN A REASONABLY SAFE CONDITION AND WARN OF THE 
DANGEROUS SPILL CONDITION 
As a landowner or possessor of land, Respondent owed its customers, including the 
Appellant, a duty: (a) "to keep the premises reasonably safe" and (b) "to warn of any concealed 
dangers which the landowner knows of or should have known of upon reasonable investigation of 
the land." Stem v. Prouty, 152 Idaho 590,594,272 P.3d 562, 566 (2012). The duty to warn of a 
dangerous condition is premised upon the proprietor's "superior knowledge" of the perilous 
instrumentality and the danger therefrom to persons going upon the property. Tommerup v. 
Albertson's Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 3, 607 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1980), overruled on other grounds by 
Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989). In this case, Respondent did not warn of 
the spill danger its business practices created and which Respondent was aware of for about four 
years before the day Appellant encountered a spill, and Respondent did not keep the premises in a 
reasonably safe condition. 
Respondent's knowledge of the recurring and dangerous spill condition at its Store 2508 is 
obvious. Spills were such a serious recurring and continuous hazard at Store 2508 that Respondent 
warned its employees about it, and it did so for about four years leading up to the day that Appellant 
slipped in Respondent's store. It is undisputed that the Appellant was not warned.56 And, 
Respondent presented no evidence that it warned its customers about the recurring and continuous 
spill condition. Instead, Respondent states that it was not aware of any warning given to its 
customers about the recurring and continuous spill condition: 
56 R. 000100-101. 
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Q. Did Wal-Mart, in June of 2015, did Wal-Mart do anything to 
alert customers to that fact [- that spills are largely responsible 
for slip, trip and fall accidents in the store]? 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q. Is there a sign that says warning, customers, spills are largely 
responsible for slip, trip, fall accidents in this store? 
A. I'm not sure. I don't -- I'm not sure. 
Q. If you don't know, is there anyone a[t] Store 2508, your store, 
who would know about such a warning being posted? 
A. Yeah, I haven't seen a warning posted. 57 
As the moving party, Respondent has the burden of showing an absence of genuine issue of 
material fact on this point, and it failed to do so. Summary judgment in Respondent's favor was 
inappropriate. 
A genuine issue of material fact also exists as to whether Respondent kept its premises in a 
reasonably safe condition. If, despite its efforts to address the recurring and continuous spill hazard, 
the spill hazard existed for about four years, it is reasonable to infer that Respondent is not keeping 
its premises in a reasonably safe condition. It is not even entirely clear that Respondent performed 
the measures it had in place to keep the premises safe on the day Appellant encountered a spill. At 
least two employees were in the area of the spill that Appellant encountered. One employee directed 
Appellant down the aisle where Appellant slipped in the spill. 58 Another employee was across the 
action alley and at the bike cone immediately across from the spill that Appellant encountered. 59 
The facts are undisputed that Appellant left one employee who directed Appellant to walk 
57 R. 000127-128 (Wal-Mart 30(b)(6), pp. 75:18 - 76:5). 
58 R. 000042-43; 47-48; and 52-54 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, pp. 95:16 - 96:13 (describing 
incident); pp. 102:17 - 103:7 (describing incident)). 
59 R. 00004 7-48 (Deposition of Michael Johnson, 102: 17 - 103 :7 ( describing incident and employee 
standing near spill); R. 000157 (Respondent employee incident statement); R. 000125 (Wal-Mart 
30(b)(6), pp. 66:12 - 67:22 (30(b)(6) witness identifying the front bike rack cone across from spill)). 
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down the housewares aisle, only to slip and fall just feet away from another employee immediately 
across the aisle from where the spill was located. And, in between the two employees was the action 
alley where other employees were supposed to be looking for spills. If, as Respondent testifies, its 
employees are supposed to be looking around their immediate area to make sure it is safe for 
customers, it is reasonable to infer that Respondent's employees did not perform their duties on the 
day Appellant encountered the spill. Given these facts and the reasonable inferences that must be 
drawn from them, it was inappropriate for the Trial Court to grant summary judgment in 
Respondent's favor. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court missed or ignored evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact 
preventing summary judgment in Respondent's favor. Drawing all reasonable inferences in a light 
most favorable to Appellant, a jury must decide whether Respondent knew or should have known 
about the continuous or recurring spill hazard at Respondent's Store 2508. Drawing all reasonable 
inferences in a light most favorable to Appellant, a jury must decide whether Respondent warned of 
the continuous and recurring spill hazard at Respondent's Store 2508 and whether Respondent 
maintained the area where Appellant encountered the spill in a reasonably safe manner. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of December, 2017. 
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